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Introduction  
An important aspect of any arbitral process is the award that is rendered at the end of the 
proceedings. A successful party would always want to enforce any award that is rendered in the 
event that the other party fails to honor that award.  The Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (“the New York Convention”) deals with the 
recognition and enforcement of   foreign arbitral awards.  The New York Convention is by and 
large seen as very successful because it has greater acceptance internationally1 than treaties for 
reciprocal enforcement of judgments2.  Furthermore, awards are seen as bringing finality to 
arbitral proceedings because there are limited grounds upon which they can be challenged3. 
Under the New York Convention, there are very limited grounds upon which an enforcing Court 
can refuse to enforce an award4.   However, over the last few years, there has been a growing 
problem in relation to arbitral awards. Indeed, the arbitral community has had to deal with the 
vexed question of what an enforcing Court should do when it is faced with an award that has 
been annulled.  Where an award is refused recognition and/or enforcement by a Court other than 
the Court of the seat of the arbitration, that award nevertheless remains valid and there is nothing 
controversial about this. What is more controversial is where an award has been set aside by the 
Courts of the seat of the arbitration. The problem with annulled awards is that there is the 
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1 There are currently 157 countries that are signatories to the New York Convention. See also Redfern and Hunter on 
International Arbitration (6th ed), Oxford University Press 2015, page 29.  
2  The only major multilateral treaty on recognition and enforcement of Court judgments is the Brussels 1 
Regulation (Recast) EU 1215/2012. 
3 For example, under the English Arbitration Act 1996, an award can only be challenged for lack of jurisdiction by 
the arbitrators under section 67 and serious irregularity under section 68. An appeal on a point of law is only 
permissible under section 69 if the parties have not excluded that right and the seat of the arbitration is England and 
the applicable law to the dispute is English Law.   
4 See Article V of the New York Convention. 
potential for the award creditor to forum shop until it finds a jurisdiction that is willing to enforce 
that annulled award. This could be particularly detrimental to the award debtor given that this 
award could potentially be shopped around signatory countries (where the award debtor has 
assets) thereby not giving finality to the award debtor. Consequently, this raises the difficult 
question of whether or not an arbitral award that has been set aside or annulled by the Courts of 
the seat of the arbitration should be enforced by the Courts of another country.  
Various jurisdictions have taken different approaches to the issue of enforcing arbitral awards 
that have been set aside at the seat of the arbitration and indeed the effect res judicata may have 
on the enforcement of an arbitral award. The inconsistency that is starting to emerge is well 
illustrated by the number of cases that have been or are being considered in various 
jurisdictions5. For example, Maximov v. Novolipetsk Steel Plant6 has now come before the 
English Courts despite previous and ongoing proceedings in France and Holland7.   The 
difficulty that is emerging is further highlighted by a recent case8 where the Luxembourg Court 
of Appeal refused to enforce a $300million award against the Mexican State Oil and Gas 
Company, Pemex that was set aside at the seat of the arbitration.  Although the parties settled 
their dispute before Luxembourg’s Court of Appeal handed down its decision, it nevertheless 
demonstrates the differing approach that is emerging given the fact that the Luxembourg 
decision  is at odds with an earlier decision of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
that the award was indeed enforceable9.  It is anticipated that there will be various enforcement 
proceedings that will arise from the ongoing Yukos10 arbitration that was conducted under the 
auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration arising out of the Energy Charter Treaty. It may 
be recalled that in 2014, the tribunal awarded shareholders in Yukos $50 billion but the interim 
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2011 – Translated <https://www.pravo.unizg.hr/_download/repository/Netherlands_No._41.pdf> accessed 7 May 
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7 See fn 50. 
8 See Corporacion Mexicana de Matenimiento Intergral, S De RL De CV (“Commisa”) v Pemex- Exploracion y 
Produccion. 
9 This decision is discussed later in this article.  
10 The Russian Federation v Veteran Petroleum Limited, Yukos Universal Limited and Hulley Enterprises Limited 
C/09/477160/HA ZA 15-1. 
and final awards were subsequently set aside by the District Court of Hague in 2016 on 
jurisdictional grounds. The shareholders have appealed the decision of the District Court of 
Hague and are planning to exercise their rights to enforce the awards in various jurisdictions 
such as the USA, England, Germany, Belgium, India and France despite the fact that it has been 
set aside11.  This is likely to generate significant inconsistencies in terms of decisions from the 
various jurisdictions at significant expense and cost to the parties.      
The inconsistencies are due to a number of reasons.  First, the New York Convention doesn’t 
define or deal with what the role of the seat of arbitration should be in the arbitral process. 
Secondly, the New York Convention doesn’t provide that, where an award is annulled at the seat 
of the arbitration, that award should not be enforced by the Courts of another country. Rather, 
Article V (e) of the New York Convention simply states that an enforcing Court “may” refuse to 
enforce an annulled award. This permissive language has been seized upon by certain 
commentators12 and jurisdictions13 as giving enforcing Courts unfettered discretion at the 
enforcement stage.  Thirdly, there are two different schools of thought in terms of enforcing 
annulled awards.  The first is the territorial approach which states that the seat of the arbitration 
has complete and effective control over the arbitration proceedings14. On the other hand, there 
are the proponents15 of the floating award and/or delocalized award that argue that awards are 
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shareholders announced that they have decided to withdraw enforcement proceedings in France because most of the 
attachments they had obtained against Russian assets had been lifted by the French Courts. See  
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1148728/yukos-shareholders-give-up-on-enforcement-in-france accessed 
10 October 2017.    In November 2017, a similar announcement was made by   the shareholders that they would be 
abandoning their attempt to enforce the award in Belgium as well because “it no longer makes economic sense to 
pursue them. See http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1149646/yukos-shareholders-abandon-belgian-front 
accessed 2 November 2017.  
12 See fn 15. 
13 This has been the approach adopted in France. This is discussed later in the article.  
14 See for example, A.J Van Den berg, “Enforcement of Annulled Awards” (1998) 9(2) ICC bulletin (November) 15, 
M. Kerr “Arbitration and the Courts: The UNCITRAL Model Law” (1985) 34 ICLQ 1, at page 15, A. J van den 
Berg, “Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Annulled in Russia” (2010) 27(2) Journal of International Arbitration 189.  
15 See E. Galliard, “The Representations of International Arbitration” (2007) New York Law Journal 67, J Paulsson, 
“Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment (LSA) (1998) 9 (1) ICC Bulletin 14.  
not anchored to any seat or jurisdiction and the fact that an award has been annulled by the seat 
should not preclude enforcement in another country. In fact, some commentators have gone as 
far as to suggest that no attention should be paid to any annulment decision rendered by the 
supervisory Courts of the arbitration16.  
 
This article examines the issue of annulled awards and their subsequent enforcement. It argues 
that the permissive wording of Article V of the New York Convention must be construed 
narrowly and enforcing Courts must show self-restraint when exercising this discretion. Indeed, 
one of the advantages of arbitration is finality and this advantage is now at risk given the 
emerging trend of enforcing annulled awards. Whilst the author doesn’t argue for a unified 
approach, some degree of consistency is needed.  It is the case that any decision made by the 
Courts of the seat of the arbitration remains important and should not be disregarded. It cannot 
be right that the Courts of the seat of the arbitration play an important role before and during 
arbitral proceedings but any decision rendered by the same in relation to an award rendered in 
that territory is rendered virtually redundant by an enforcing Court. An approach that seeks to put 
the enforcing Court at the heart of annulled awards for self-preserving reasons is self-defeating. 
It is self-defeating because it does nothing to promote consistency, international comity and party 
autonomy. Party autonomy is the cornerstone of arbitration and such an approach portrays 
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism that lacks any coherence. As Lord Mance recently 
noted17  
“Arbitration already faces problems in maintaining coherence in its own jurisprudence 
and confidence in its efficacy and appropriateness as a dispute resolution mechanism. I 
suggest that these could be exacerbated, if either arbitration or courts dealing with 
arbitration issues seek to declare unilateral independence”18.  
It is important that the agreement of the parties should be respected. Indeed, what is needed is a 
pragmatic approach that seeks to recognise the importance of the Courts of the seat of the 
arbitration and where careful judicial consideration is given to any decision that is rendered by 
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Bulletin 14.  
17 J. Mance “Arbitration: A Law unto itself” (2016), 32 Arbitration International 223. 
18 Ibid at page 241.  
the supervisory Courts in relation to the award rendered in that territory. This article also 
examines the effect of res judicata on annulled awards and argues that there is now a danger that 
an enforcing Court may be taking on a role not ascribed to it by the parties or the New York 
Convention.    
 
The need for a party to enforce an annulled award may arise in various ways.  An enforcing 
Court may be faced with the following scenarios:  
(a) A party may seek to enforce an award in another country where that award has been set aside 
by the Courts of the seat of arbitration.  This raises the question of whether or not the enforcing 
Court should simply refuse to enforce the award or does it have the discretion to enforce that 
award? 
 
(b) By a judgment of the Court of the seat of arbitration, an award is set aside. The other party 
nevertheless seeks to enforce that award in another country where the award debtor has assets. 
Should the enforcing Court enforce that award or will the judgment of the Court of the seat of the 
arbitration preclude enforcement on the basis of issue estoppel?   
 
(c)   A party may seek to enforce an award in various jurisdictions and one jurisdiction refuses to 
grant leave to enforce the award under the New York Convention on the basis that the award has 
not yet become binding. Should that judgment be a bar to enforcement on the basis of issue 
estoppel?   
 
(d) Where one party has unsuccessfully challenged an award at the seat of the arbitration on 
various grounds but subsequently seeks to add another ground to its challenge but is also 
unsuccessful, should an enforcing Court refuse to enforce the award where there might be public 
policy reasons for refusing to enforce the award? Or will the decisions of other enforcing Courts 
preclude enforcement on the basis of issue estoppel?   
 
(e)  Where a party seeks to enforce an award that is the subject of a challenge before the Courts 
of the seat of the arbitration, is that award enforceable in another country prior to setting aside 
the same?  Or must the enforcing Court wait until that award has been set aside?    
 (f) Where a party has unsuccessfully sought to challenge an award at the seat of the arbitration, 
should an enforcing Court take the unsuccessful challenge into account at the enforcement stage?   
 
New York Convention  
 
The New York Convention is often seen as a highly successful Convention and it is cited as one 
of the advantages of arbitration19. There are limited grounds upon which an enforcing Court can 
refuse to enforce an arbitral award pursuant to Article V. However, the New York Convention 
does not exclude the right to enforce an award that has been set aside at the seat of the 
arbitration. Article V (1) (e) of the New York Convention simply provides that an award may be 
refused recognition or enforcement if:  
“The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
that award was made”. 
It is clear that an enforcing Court has discretion as to whether or not to enforce an annulled 
award and the basis upon which to do so.  However, it is argued that this permissive language 
should not be seen as unfettered liberty for the enforcing Court to ignore any decision on the 
award by the supervisory Courts.  This sits well with the argument that arbitration has a 
territorial link20 to the seat and cannot exist in a vacuum.  However, various jurisdictions have 
adopted different approaches to Article V (1)(e) of the New York Convention with a great deal 
of inconsistency.  For example, in France, the approach has been that international arbitration is 
transnational and is not attached to any national legal regime21.   
 
Seat of Arbitration: The English Approach 
                                                          
19 See Fn 1 and 2.  
20 See F. Mann Lex Facit Arbittrum, [1986] 2 Arbitration International 241. See also William Park, "Lex Loci 
Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration" [1983] 32 ICLQ 21.  
21 This reflects the delocalised  approach discussed above. The French approach is further discussed below.  
The seat of arbitration plays a vital role in the arbitral process and it is the geographical location 
which the arbitration is tied. The seat is important for a number of reasons. First, the seat will 
normally have the supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration.  It is normally the Courts of the 
seat of that arbitration that the parties turn to for supervisory power and/or supportive powers. 
For example, if the one party fails to appoint an arbitrator or the appointment procedure breaks 
down, it is normally the Courts of the seat of the arbitration that will appoint the arbitrators22.  
Likewise, where one party seeks to remove an arbitrator for bias or impartiality, that party will 
turn to the Courts of the seat of that arbitration23.   Furthermore, a party seeking an injunction 
will normally do so from the Courts of the seat of the arbitration24.   Secondly, the seat 
determines whether or not any award is enforceable under the New York Convention25.  Thirdly, 
the seat is important in determining whether the award is subject to review under the laws of the 
seat of the arbitration or the award is simply enforceable as a foreign award under the New York 
Convention26. Accordingly, if one accepts that the Courts of the seat of the arbitration have 
supervisory powers over arbitral proceedings, then its decision on annulment must also be 
important at the enforcement stage. The English Courts have been consistent in their approach in 
stressing the importance of the seat of the arbitration and have always rejected the notion of a 
floating or delocalised arbitration27. The English approach is that there is a contractual promise 
                                                          
22 For example, see section 18 of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
23 See for example, section 24 of the Arbitration Act 1996.  
24  See section 44 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The English Courts have however held that in certain circumstances a 
foreign Court and not the Courts of the seat of arbitration might be better placed to grant an interim order especially 
where the subject matter of the dispute is situated in that foreign jurisdiction. This was the position in U& M Mining 
Zambia Ltd v Konkola Copper Mines PLC [2013] EWHC 260 (Comm), [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 218, where Blair J 
held that the foreign Court was better placed to grant the relief sought given that it would have been difficult for the 
English Court to grant an interim order against a party who was present in England only because of the arbitration.  
25 See Article I(3).  
26 Under English Law, an award is deemed to be made in the place of the seat of the arbitration (sections 53 and 
100(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996). Consequently, if the award is made in England, it is subject to the review of 
the English Courts. Alternatively, if the award is not made in England it will be entitled to be enforced in England 
pursuant to section 101 of the 1996 Act or section 66 of the same.  
27 See Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 291.  Bank Mallet v 
Helliniki Techniki SA [1984] 1 Q.B 291, Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC v Paymentech Merchant Services Inc [2000] 
by each of the parties by agreeing to the curial law to treat the Courts of the seat of the arbitration 
as having exclusive supervisory jurisdiction. This was the position in A v B28 where the Court 
held that “the whole structure of the supervisory jurisdiction of the seat of an international 
arbitration would be completely undermined” if the Courts of the seat of arbitration did not have 
exclusive supervisory powers over arbitrations seated in that jurisdiction29. 
 
The English Courts have made it clear that where a party wants to challenge an award rendered 
in a London seated arbitration, it must do so in England. This was the case in Cv D30 where the 
English High Court restrained an insurer from challenging the partial award in New York as the 
seat of the arbitration was England.  The need for the Courts of the seat of the arbitration to have 
supervisory powers over arbitral proceedings was evident in Kazakhstan v Istil Group PlC31 
where the English Courts were prepared to exercise their supervisory powers to grant an 
injunction against a party that insisted on carrying on with arbitral proceedings despite the 
English Courts having set aside the initial award on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction under 
section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (“the Act”). 
 
In the author’s view, the starting point must be that if the Court of the seat of the arbitration has 
annulled an award rendered in its territory such award should ordinarily not be enforced 
elsewhere unless there are compelling reasons why that decision should not be respected by the 
enforcing Courts. Agreed, there might be situations where an enforcing Court may want to 
scrutinise the decision of the supervisory Courts, for example, where the Courts of the seat of 
arbitration have retrospectively applied a law that was not in existence at the time contract was 
made. This approach means that the enforcing Court retains the discretion afforded to it by 
Article V (e) of the New York Convention but at the same time proper consideration is given to 
the decision of the supervisory Courts. It is not acceptable to, on the one hand accept that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
EWHC 228 (Comm) [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 265, Halpern v Halpern, [2007] EWCA Civ 291, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
56. 
28 A v B (No2), [2007] EWHC 54 (Comm), [2007] 1 All E.R. Comm 633. 
29  Ibid at para 52.  See also Nobel v Gerling [2007] EWHC 253 (Comm), 1 C.L.C 85. 
30 [2007] EWHC 1541 (Comm), [2007] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 557.  
31 [2007] EWHC 2729 (Comm) [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 382.  
Courts of the seat of the arbitration have supervisory powers over the arbitration, but on the other 
hand ignore their decisions in relation to an award annulled by the same Courts. 
 
Annulled Awards and Enforcement  
In relation to scenario (a) above, a party may wish to enforce an award that has been set aside by 
the supervisory Courts. This raises the question whether or not that award should be enforced by 
the enforcing Court and what emphasis should be placed on the decision of the supervisory 
Courts. It has been argued that where an award has been set aside by the supervisory Court of the 
arbitration, then that award becomes non-existent at the seat of the arbitration32. The issue of 
whether an award that has been set aside at the seat of the arbitration should be enforced was 
considered by the English Courts in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan33. Although the case did not involve an 
award that had been set aside at the seat of the arbitration, the English Courts nevertheless still 
considered this issue as the case involved the enforcement of an arbitral award that was rendered 
in another country, namely France. At first instance, Aiken J set aside an earlier order by Clarke 
J giving permission to Dallah to enforce a French award against the Government on the basis that 
there was no valid arbitration agreement between the parties. Aiken J's decision was upheld both 
at the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.  The key question then becomes how the 
permissive wording "may" under Article V (e) of the New York Convention and section 103 
(2)(f) of the Act should be interpreted. Earlier English cases34 that considered section 103 (2) of 
the Act expressed the view that any discretion under the Act under section 103(2)(f) could not be 
an open one. Rix LJ in Dallah held that the discretion under the Act is a narrow one where one 
                                                          
32 See Van den Berg “Enforcement of Annulled Award (1998) ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin 15.  
This is known as the principle of exnihilo nil fit which postulates that when an award has been annulled in the 
country of origin, it becomes non-existent in that country.   
33 [2008] EWHC 1901 (Comm), [2009] 1 All E.R (Comm) 505, [2009] EWCA Civ 755, [2010] 1 All E.R (Comm) 
917, [2010] UKSC 46, [2011] 1 All ER (Comm) 383. 
34 In Kanoria v Guinness [2006] EWCA Civ 222, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 701, Lord Phillips noted that it was 
doubtful whether the Courts would have a broad discretion under the section if one party was able to satisfy one of 
the grounds under the same. A similar view was expressed by Mance LJ in Dardana Ltd v Yukos Oil Company 
[2002] EWCA Civ 543, [2002] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 819 that the discretion under the Act could not be an open 
discretion but one based on an established legal principle. See para 8. 
of the defences is established35. He went on to say that it was a delicate matter where an award 
has been improperly set aside by the supervisory Courts; it was simply not a matter of open 
discretion. The improper circumstances must be brought to the attention of and considered by the 
enforcing Courts36. This would suggest that there are very limited situations where an award that 
has been set aside by the supervisory Courts can be enforced37.  
At the Supreme Court, Lord Mance's comments that “an English judgment holding that the 
award is not valid could prove significant in relation to such proceedings, if French courts 
recognise any principle similar to the English principle of issue estoppel...."38 proved not be 
significant as the French Courts gave no consideration to the decision of the UK's Supreme Court 
that the arbitrators did not have jurisdiction. The Paris Court of Appeal held that the Government 
of Pakistan was bound by the arbitration agreement and refused to set aside the French award. 
For his part, Lord Collins noted that a determination by the Court of the seat of the arbitration 
may give rise to issue estoppel or some other preclusive effect in the Court in which enforcement 
is sought39. Moore-Bick LJ in Dallah noted that it may be necessary to consider whether the 
discretion of the English Courts to enforce an award that has been set aside by the supervisory 
Court is broader than previously recognised40. Consequently, what is clear is that the various 
judges in Dallah took the view that the discretionary language under the New York Convention 
and the Act is not an open one.  
 
The opportunity to re-examine this discretion arose in Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil 
Company41 where four awards totaling over $400million were issued in favour of Yukos against 
Rosneft in 2006. The seat of the arbitration was Russia and in 2007 the awards were set aside by 
                                                          
35 See para 89. 
36 See para 91. 
37 See paras 89 to 90. 
38 See para 29.  
39 Se para 98. 
40 See para 59.  
41 [2014] EWHC 2188 (Comm), [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 435.  This  was not the first trial of a preliminary issue in this 
case. In an earlier case, Yukos Capital SARL v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co (No2) [2011] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 443, Hamblen J 
considered whether the defendant was estopped by the Amsterdam decision and whether or not the principles of 
non- justiciable applied in the case. The first issue is discussed later in this article.  
the Russian Arbitrazh Court. Despite this, enforcement proceedings were commenced in the 
Dutch Courts and at first instance the Dutch District Court initially refused leave to enforce the 
award. This was on the basis that an annulment decision by the Courts of the seat of the 
arbitration should only be disregarded in "extraordinary circumstances" and such circumstances 
had not been sufficiently asserted.  In April 2009, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal gave leave to 
enforce the awards on the basis that the annulments in Russia were a result of “partial and 
dependent judicial process” and should not be recognised. Despite the leave to enforce, the 
awards remained unsatisfied and Yukos commenced proceedings in the English Courts to 
enforce the Russian awards that were set aside. Simon J considered two issues. First, whether in 
light of the set aside decisions, the awards could no longer be enforced at common law because 
they no longer existed.  Rosneft argued that, given the set aside decisions, the awards no longer 
existed under Russian law and hence there was no longer any extant obligation on which Yukos 
could bring an action in the English Court. The judge held that the Court had the power to 
enforce the awards at common law despite the set aside decisions of the Russian Courts42  
because it would be unacceptable if the English Courts were bound to recognise a decision of a 
foreign Court which offended the basic principles of “honesty, natural justice and domestic 
concepts of public policy”43.   
In order for the English Courts to enforce an award that has been set aside at the seat of the 
arbitration, positive and cogent evidence that the decision offended basic principles of honesty, 
natural justice and domestic concept of public policy will be needed44.  This was the position in 
Malicorp Ltd v Government of Arab Republic of Egypt45where Walker J had to consider whether 
or not to enforce an award that had been set aside in Egypt which was the seat of the arbitration. 
The dispute arose out of a concession agreement in relation to construction and operation of an 
airport in Egypt. In 2004, Malicorp commenced arbitration proceedings and in 2006 obtained an 
award of $10 million plus costs and interest in its favour. In 2008, Malicorp unsuccessfully 
sought to enforce the award before both the Paris Court of Appeal and the Paris Court of 
                                                          
42 At para 22. 
43 At para 20. 
44 Malicorp Ltd v Government of Arab Republic of Egypt [2015] EWHC 361 (Comm), [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 423. 
45 [2015] EWHC 361 (Comm), [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 423. 
 
Cassation. The award was subsequently set aside by the Cairo Court of Appeal46. In 2012, 
Malicorp sought permission of the English Courts to enforce the Egyptian award that was set 
aside under section 101 (2) of the Act. This application was considered by Flaux J on paper and 
granted permission to enforce but reserving Egypt's right to apply for the order to be set aside.  
Given that the Cairo award was a New York Convention award, Walker J could only refuse 
enforcement if the case fell within sections 103(2) to 103(4) of the Act in particular section 
103(2). Malicorp argued that the Egyptian decision to set aside should not be given effect for 
three reasons. First, it was tainted by bias. Secondly, it was contrary to natural justice and the 
Egyptian Courts deliberately misapplied Egyptian law. Lastly, the grounds on which the award 
was set aside were wrong and misconceived. On the last point, Walker J quickly dismissed this 
argument on the basis that this was not a sufficient basis upon which the English Courts could 
refuse to recognise that decision as the determination of foreign law was a matter for the foreign 
Court. In relation to the first two grounds of objection,   Egypt's argument was that, given that 
the Cairo award had been set aside it should not be enforced by the English Courts restating the 
exnihilo nil fit principle. Walker J did not find it necessary to consider the exnihilo nil fit 
principle but simply proceeded on the basis that he had discretion whether or not to recognise the 
decision pursuant to section 103(2) of the Act.  He cited the decision of Simon J in Yukos with 
approval and held that the evidence before him was not cogent enough to substantiate Malicorp's 
first two objections. Consequently, where it is established that the decision setting aside the 
award meets the test for recognition there is no need to exercise any discretion not to recognise 
it47.  Walker J's approach follows that of Simon J and it seems that the English Courts are only 
prepared to use their discretion to enforce an award that has been set aside by the supervisory 
Courts in limited circumstances.  
 
Indeed, it seems that the level of cogency needed is a high one. This is evident from a recent case 
where the English Courts considered whether or not an award that had been set aside in Russia  
should be enforced in England. This was the issue Burton J considered in Nikolay Viktorovich 
Maximov v Open Joint Stock Company Novolipetsky Metallurgichesky KomBinat48.  The dispute 
                                                          
46 The Court of Appeal's decision has been appealed to the Egyptian Court of Cassation. 
47 See para 28.  
48  [2017] EWHC 1911 (Comm). 
arose out of a Share Purchase Agreement whereby the defendant agreed to acquire 50 % plus one 
share of the claimant's holding in a group of companies on the basis of a purchase price 
calculated in accordance with clauses 3 and 4 of the Share Purchase Agreement. A dispute arose 
between the parties as to the purchase price and this was resolved by an arbitral tribunal under 
the International Commercial Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
the Russian Federation (ICAC) and the arbitrators awarded (by a majority)  RUB 8.9 billion plus 
interest49.  OJSC appealed and the award was set aside by Moscow Arbitrazh Court in June 2011 
on three grounds. First, that two of the arbitrators had failed to disclose links to the expert 
witnesses whose reports were submitted in the arbitration by the claimant, Maximov. The two 
other grounds upon which the award was set aside were public policy and non- arbitrability both 
of which were never fully argued before the Court.  The decision of the Moscow Arbitrazh Court 
to set aside the award was upheld by the Federal Arbitrazh Court of Moscow in October 2011. A 
permission to appeal to the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation was refused on 
paper in January 201250.  Maximov sought to enforce the award in England under the New York 
Convention and at common law. Maximov argued that the Russian decision setting aside the 
award should not be recognised and urged the Court to infer bias from the perverse nature of the 
Russian Court's conclusions and the manner in which they were reached despite there being no 
evidence of actual bias. Burton J noted that the fact that a foreign Court's decision is manifestly 
wrong or perverse is not sufficient. The decision must be so wrong with evidence of bias or that 
a Court acting in good faith could not have arrived at such as decision.  Secondly, the evidence 
or grounds must be cogent. Lastly, the decision of the foreign Court must be deliberately wrong 
and not simply wrong by incompetence51. Despite the criticisms52 of Burton J of the grounds 
                                                          
49 The dissenting view was of little significance as there was only a 1% difference in the amount between the 
dissenting arbitrator and the majority.   
50 There had been other proceedings in France and Amsterdam. In the French proceedings, Maximov successfully 
applied to the Tribunal de Grand Instance of Paris to enforce the award and the defendant failed to overturn that 
decision at the Paris Court of Appeal.  In the Dutch proceedings, Maximov applied to have the award enforced in the 
Amsterdam District Court which was refused. There was an unsuccessful appeal to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
in 2016 and there was an appeal to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands.   This appeal was unsuccessful as in late 
2017 the Supreme Court of Netherlands also refused to enforce the award.   
51 See para 16.  
upon which the award was set aside by the Russian Courts, he was not persuaded that the 
decision of the Russian Court was so extreme and perverse that it was tainted by bias against the 
claimant53.  The judge acknowledges the "harsh" nature of the Russian decision but noted that 
this might be a reflection of the approach of the Russian Courts towards arbitration54.  
Consequently, given that there was no cogent evidence of bias against Maximov, the judge 
dismissed the claimant's application to enforce the award55.    Indeed, it is now the case that the 
English Courts have set a very high threshold that the applicant must satisfy as the Courts will 
not invoke the principles of honesty, natural justice and bias lightly. Accordingly, English Courts 
will only enforce an annulled award where compelling reasons have been demonstrated by the 
party seeking to enforce that award.  Since Burton J’s decision, the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands has also refused to enforce the award that was set aside by the Russian Courts. 
Whilst the Supreme Court agreed with the decision of Amsterdam Court of Appeal that an award 
set aside at the seat of arbitration is not automatically unenforceable under the New York 
Convention, it nevertheless rejected the argument that the Moscow Arbitrazh lacked 
independence when it set aside the Russian awards.   Given the comments of Burton J that “….it 
is common ground that if it remained unchanged there would be issue estoppel on many if not 
most of the issues which fell to be determined by me, there is an outstanding appeal on two 
grounds by the Claimant to the Dutch Supreme Court…” It remains to be seen what impact the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Netherlands will have on any appeal proceedings in London.  
 
It is not unusual for a losing party in the arbitration proceedings wanting to challenge the award 
at the seat of the arbitration. There are instances where the award is yet to be set aside by the 
supervisory Court as the appeal may be pending or subject to further appeals. However, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
52 Burton J noted that on the issue of public policy, the first instance decision was hopeless and it was  "borderline 
arguable at best, not least in the light of her own previous sceptical treatment of allegations of breach of public 
policy where error of law could not succeed". At para 56.  In relation to arbitrability, the judge noted that the issue 
of non-arbitrability was adventurous given that there had been no material judicial decision in favour of it, albeit 
some academic support for the concept of non- arbitrability.  In addition, the parties were not given any opportunity 
to address the Court on the point. At par 56.   
53 See para 62. 
54 See para 63. 
55 See paras 63 and 71. 
successful party may nevertheless wish to exercise its right to enforce the award in another 
country. The enforcing Court is then faced with the difficult decision of whether or not to 
enforce an award that is the subject of an appeal at the seat of the arbitration. This is scenario (e) 
above.  This obviously involves a balancing act on the one hand to ensure that enforcement is not 
delayed by a frivolous challenge at the seat of the arbitration and on the other not to pre-empt the 
outcome of the decision of the Courts of the seat of the arbitration by a quick enforcement.  The 
New York Convention gives a degree of discretion to the enforcing Court under Article VI and it 
may adjourn the decision on enforcement and order security if appropriate. This issue has been 
considered on various occasions by the English Courts. In IPCO (Nigeria) v Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation56 Gross J had to consider an application under section 103 (5) of the Act.  
The case concerned a $150million award rendered in 2003 in Nigeria and NNPC sought to 
challenge the award before the Nigeria Courts57.  Gross J held that enforcement of the award 
should be adjourned but ordered that NNPC should pay $13 to IPCO and provide security in 
London for $50million.  A similar approach was adopted by Burton J in Dowans Holdings SA v 
Tanzania Electric Supply Co Ltd 58   where the judge was prepared to adjourn enforcement of an 
award pending a challenge at the seat of the arbitration in Tanzania provided security in the sum 
                                                          
56 [2005] EWHC 726 (Comm), [2005] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 326. 
57 This case has a long history. After the decision of Gross J in 2005, about 4 years later another application was 
made before the English Courts to enforce the award. On this occasion, Tomlinson J was asked to revisit Gross J's 
initial order [2008] EWHC 797 (Comm) [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 59 because no progress had been made in the 
challenge before the Nigerian Courts.  Tomlinson J held that there was a likelihood that IPCO would succeed in 
some of its claim; hence he ordered a further partial payment of about $50Million should be paid by NNPC on an 
interim basis.  This decision was appealed by NNPC on the basis that the judge could not order payment on an 
interim basis- he could enforce the award in its entirety or adjourn the decision to enforce the award.   The Court of 
Appeal rejected NNPC's appeal [2008] EWCA Civ 1157, [2009] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 611. In 2009, there was an 
allegation that the award was procured by fraud so the parties agreed by way of a consent order that Tomlinson J's 
order be set aside whilst the fraud allegation was resolved by the Nigerian Courts.  In 2014, IPCO was back before 
the English Courts on the basis that the fraud allegation was made to simply frustrate the enforcement proceedings. 
Despite the passage of time, the application to set aside the award had still not been resolved. Field J on this 
occasion held that on the fraud allegation nothing had changed so as to lift the consent order. Furthermore, given the 
fraud allegation, there was real possibility that the whole award could be vacated. [2014] EWHC 576 (Comm) 
[2014] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 625. see paras 93-95.  
58 [2011] EWHC 1957 (Comm), [2011] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 475.  
of $5 million was provided by Electric Supply Company.  In deciding whether or not to adjourn 
enforcement, the Court must consider the prospect of success of the application to set aside the 
award before the supervisory Courts. The test to be applied was laid down in Soleh Boneh 
International Ltd v Government of the Republic of Uganda59. First, the strength of the argument 
that the award is invalid must be considered. If the award is manifestly invalid, there should be 
an adjournment and no order for security. Alternatively, if the award is manifestly valid, then the 
award should be enforced immediately or there should be an order for substantial security60. 
Secondly, the Court must consider the ease or difficulty of the enforcement of the award and 
whether enforcement will become more difficult if enforcement is delayed. If enforcement is 
likely to be more difficult, then the case to order security is stronger61.   
Where the English Court is convinced that the appeal before the supervisory Court is being 
properly dealt with, then the Courts will be minded to adjourn any enforcement proceedings and 
a security in the full amount of the award will be ordered. This was the position in Travis Coal 
Restructured Holdings LLC v ESSAR Global Limited 62 where Essar sought to set aside a 
judgment enforcing an award rendered by an ICC tribunal in the USA. Essar argued that 
recognition and enforcement of the award should be adjourned pending the determination of 
proceedings filed by Essar challenging the award before the Southern District Court of New 
York. Travis opposed any adjournment on the basis the Court should order immediate 
enforcement of the award in full but in the event that the Court was minded to adjourn an order 
for suitable security should be ordered. Blair J held that a risk of conflicting decisions should be 
avoided given that there was a possibility that the award could be set aside by the New York 
Court63.   Consequently, the enforcement proceedings should be adjourned provided security in 
the full amount of the award is provided by Essar64.    
                                                          
59 [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 208. 
60 As per Staughton LJ at page 212.  
61 Ibid. 
62 [2014] EWHC 2510, [2014] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 494. 
63 Blair J was concerned about comity and noted that “… the same kind of comity considerations can in my view 
arise, depending on the facts. Where it is plain that a challenge to an award is being properly dealt with in the 
courts of the seat of the arbitration, common sense may indicate that an adjournment is preferable to a decision by 
the enforcing court dealing with the same issues. In such a case, the power to order security may be particularly 
Related to the issue of whether an award should be enforced pending an appeal at the seat of the 
arbitration is the question of when does an award become binding on the parties pursuant to 
section 103(f) of the Act. In Dowans, Burton J had to consider whether or not an award had 
become binding on the parties.  Dowans sought to enforce an ICC Award arising out of an 
emergency power off –take agreement that was rendered in its favor in England. The defendant 
subsequently challenged the award before the Tanzanian Court being the supervisory Court.  An 
order was initially granted to enforce the award in England but the Electric Supply Company 
sought to set aside the order on the basis of Section 103(2)(f) or to adjourn recognition or 
enforcement under section 103(5) of the Act. In relation to the former, the judge noted that it was 
for the English Court to decide whether or not the award had become binding. Burton J held that 
the award had become binding on the parties despite the defendant’s application to set aside the 
award before the Tanzanian Courts65.  
However, where the parties have agreed in their arbitration agreement that any award rendered 
by the tribunal must be subjected to another review process, this then raises the  question at what 
stage during the process will the award become binding on the parties. This issue was considered 
by Eder J in Diag. Diag had obtained an award in its favour arising out of an agreement to 
modernise the Czech blood transfusion system. Following the breakdown of the relationship 
between the parties, Diag commenced adhoc arbitration proceedings and a “final award” (which 
was the subject of this application) was issued in 2008. However, the arbitration agreement 
contained an additional review process of any arbitral award rendered by the tribunal. Following 
the publication of the award, both parties sought to invoke the review process set out in the 
arbitration agreement but Diag eventually withdrew its review request and sought to enforce the 
award in France, USA, Luxembourg and Austria. There were no attempts to enforce at the seat 
of the arbitration. Those enforcement proceedings were unsuccessful except in Luxembourg and 
the USA which were still pending at the time the matter came before the English Courts.  In 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
important to prevent the inevitable delay prejudicing the recovery prospects of the party in whose favour the award 
was made” At para 37.  Similar comity points were raised by Gross J in IPCO v NNPC at para 16 and Mance LJ in 
Yukos oil Company v Dardana Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 543,   [2002] 2 Lloyd’s’ Rep 326 at para 23.   
64 At para 74.  
65 See paras 24-27. 
April 2013, the Supreme Court of Austria held that the “final Award” had not yet become 
binding on the parties within the meaning of Article V (1)(e) of the New York Convention.   
 One of the issues that Eder J considered was whether or not the “final award” had become 
binding.  Diag argued that the term “ordinary recourse”66 referred to a “genuine appeal on 
merits”.  The judge took the view that it would be inappropriate for him to give a definition of 
what will constitute ordinary or extraordinary recourse, and was not persuaded that “ordinary 
recourse” should be defined as suggested by Diag67.    He nevertheless held that the award was 
subject to “ordinary recourse” and the review process had been validly triggered.  Consequently, 
the award was not binding for the purposes of section 103(f) of the Act.   
Although Eder J refused to give any definition of ordinary and extraordinary recourse, the case is 
indicative of how the English Courts may deal with this type of rare application.  Eder J noted 
that there might be a fine line between the two categories, he nevertheless took the view that if 
an award is subject to ordinary recourse, it will not be binding68. It must be said that the position 
in Diag is rare given the fact that it is very unusual for parties to insert this type of review 
process in their arbitration agreement.   In fact, one may even question whether or not the clause 
in the agreement is actually an arbitration agreement.   In any event, a US court recently 
considered whether or not the same award should be enforced.  In Diag Human Se v Czech 
Republic – Ministry of Health69, the US District Court for the District of Columbia refused to 
enforce the award because “the Resolution issued by the Third Review Tribunal nullified the 
2008 Final Award and so there is nothing for the Court to enforce.” 
 
                                                          
66 In Dowans Burton J had considered the difference between ordinary recourse and extra ordinary recourse and 
noted that “…the former which may not be permitted by the terms of the relevant agreement between the parties or 
the law governing the arbitration would ordinarily be subject of a time limit, after which no such ordinary recourse 
(if otherwise available) would be permitted. There is a possibility of extraordinary recourse, which would be some 
limited challenge to the award, in the courts of its home jurisdiction, by reference to the restrictive terms of the New 
York Convention. Once ordinary recourse is excluded the possible availability of extraordinary recourse does not 
prevent an award from being, or having become, binding” at para 17.  
67 See para 21.  
68 See paras 18 &19.  
69 Case 1:13 –Cv -00355. 
Res Judicata/Issue Estoppel  
 
The doctrine of res judicata is well established as part of the English common law70. It is based 
on two fundamental principles. First, that it is in the public interest and a matter of sound 
administration of justice that there be an end to litigation and secondly, that no person should be 
proceeded against twice for the same cause71. It is generally considered to encompass two 
principles of estoppel: (1) cause of action estoppel, and (2) issue estoppel. The first category 
creates a procedural bar, ensuring that if one party commences an action against another for a 
particular cause and judgment is given on it, he cannot bring another action against the same 
party for the same cause. The second category, issue estoppel, is based on the principle that, once 
an issue has been determined by a court, then neither the parties nor their privies can relitigate 
the issue afresh72. In the absence of special circumstances, the parties cannot return to the court 
to advance arguments, claims or defences which they could have put forward for decision on the 
first occasion but which they failed to raise at that time73.  
For the doctrine to apply there must be a decision by a judicial tribunal with competent 
jurisdiction74 and it must be final and conclusive on the merits. For a judgment to qualify as final 
and conclusive on the merits, a party needs to demonstrate that the subject matter in question was 
raised and argued before the earlier tribunal, such that it cannot be re-opened before that same 
court in further proceedings75. The finality of a judgment is not simply assessed by reference to 
whether or not the judgment is final for the purposes of appeal. A decision is final if it is 
                                                          
70 Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th ed. Reissue), at paras. 977-981. 
71 P. Barnett, Res judicata, Estoppel and Foreign Judgments in Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 
London, 2001), at p.9. 
72 Authorities show that in order to establish an issue estoppel, four conditions must be satisfied, namely that: (a) the 
judgment must be given by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction; (b) the judgment must be final and conclusive 
and on the merits; (c) there must be identity of parties; and (d) there must be identity of subject matter. See Carl 
Zeiss Stifung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No.2) [1967] 1 A.C. 853; The Sennar (No.2) [1985] 1 W.L.R 490; Desert Sun 
Loan Corporation v Hill [1996] 2 All E.R. 847. 
73 Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, 67 E.R. 313. 
74 A-G for Trinidad & Tobago v Eriche [1893] A.C. 518. 
75 Eastwood & Holt v Studer (1926) 31 Com. Cas. 251; Nouvion v Freeman (1889) 15 App. Cas. 1, 9. HL; Carl 
Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No.2) [1967] 1 A.C. 853. 
incapable of revision by the court which pronounced it (for these purposes it is immaterial that it 
is capable of being rescinded or varied by an appellate court).76 The Court made clear in 
Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb 77 that the principles of res judicata apply to 
arbitration as well as litigation: 
“Issue estoppel applies to arbitration as it does to litigation. The parties having chosen 
the tribunal to determine the disputes between them as to their legal rights and duties are 
bound by the determination by that tribunal of any issue which is relevant to the decision 
of any dispute which is referred to that tribunal”78.  
 
The principle of issue estoppel is particularly important where the supervisory Courts have set 
aside an award. In relation to scenario (b) above, the issue here is not whether the award itself 
should be recognised but whether the decision or judgment of the supervisory Court should be 
recognised. This issue was considered by the English High Court and the Court of Appeal in 
Yukos Capital Sarl v OJSC Rosneft Oil Company79. At first instance, Hamblen J held that 
Rosneft was estopped by the decision of the Dutch Court of Appeal that the annulment decisions 
were the result of a “partial and dependent judicial process”80. His decision was based on the fact 
that even though the Dutch ruling was determined in the context of a different legal question i.e. 
the Dutch public order that made no difference81. As such, the finding made by the Dutch Court 
                                                          
76 Nouvion v Freeman (1889) 15 App. Cas. 1, 9 HL, Colt Industries Inc v Sarlie (No.2) [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1287. A 
decision that is reversed on appeal ceases to take effect as res judicata and the new decision becomes res judicata 
between the parties. See Railways Comr (NSW) v Cavanough (1935) 53 C.L.R. 220. 
 
77 Fidelitas Shipping Co Ltd v V/O Exportchleb [1965] 2 All E.R. 4, as approved by the Privy Council in AEGIS v 
European Reinsurance Company of Zurich [2003] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 253. 
78 [1965] 2 All E.R. 4, at p.10. See also People's Insurance Company of China v Vysanthi Shipping Company Ltd 
[2003] EWHC 1655; [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 617, where the High Court enforced an arbitral award at the expense of a 
foreign judgment because the award was first in time and the issues between the parties were res judicata . 
79 [2011] EWHC 1461 (Comm), [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 479, [2012] EWCA Civ 855, [2013] 1 All E.R. 233. The 
case arises from the same set of facts discussed above  
80 At para 107. 
81 At para 94. 
of Appeal was indivisible82. However, at the Court of Appeal Yukos argued that the issue in the 
English proceedings was exactly the same with that in the Dutch proceedings. Given that the 
Dutch Court of Appeal held that the Russian judgment setting aside the awards was "partial and 
dependent", the English Courts should also not recognise the Russian decisions. In essence, the 
argument was that since the Russian decisions were against Dutch public policy then it followed 
that it must be against English public policy. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument on the 
basis that public policy is not universal as public policy is inevitably different in each country83 
and the standard that each country will apply to determine whether  decisions from the Courts of 
another country are "partial and dependent" may vary. Consequently, it is English public policy 
that is to be applied as a matter of English law and that is not the same question as whether the 
decision is to be regarded as partial and dependent in the view of another Court according to that 
Court's law84.   This overruled Hamblen J's decision on this issue and the Court of Appeal held 
that Rosneft was not estopped in England from arguing against Yukos's assertions that the 
Russian decisions setting aside the awards were partial and dependent. The issue would have to 
be tried85.    
 
 Given that a party may attempt to enforce an award in different jurisdictions, the issue facing the 
enforcing Court may not be whether the decision of the Courts of the seat of arbitration raises 
issue estoppel but whether the decision of another enforcing Court precludes enforcement on the 
basis of issue estoppel.  This is scenario (c) above.  In Diag Human Se v Czech Republic 86 , 
where Eder J had to consider whether Diag was estopped from enforcing the award because of an 
earlier decision by the Supreme Court of Austria. Diag argued that there was no issue estoppel 
because the issue determined by Austria’s Supreme Court was different from that before the 
English Court. In particular, it argued that the Austrian Court did not consider whether there was 
in fact a valid review process as contemplated  by the arbitration agreement and that was 
important as a matter of English law to determine whether or not the award was binding under 
                                                          
82 Ibid. 
83 At para 151. 
84 At para 151. 
85 At para 157.  
86 [2014] EWHC 1639 (Comm) [2014] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 283. 
section 103(2) (f) of the Act. On the other hand, Czech Republic argued that the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Austria that the award had not yet become binding created an issue estoppel 
and the award was not binding. Eder J held that the issue determined by the Supreme Court of 
Austria was that the award was not binding and it made no difference that the decision was 
reached in relation to the New York Convention rather than under the Act. Where a foreign 
Court decides that an award is not yet binding on the parties, there is no reason in principle why 
that decision should not give rise to issue estoppel between the parties provided that the relevant 
conditions87 for establishing issue estoppel are satisfied88. Consequently, Diag was estopped 
because of the decision of the Supreme Court of Austria. This case demonstrates the need for a 
party to be careful at the enforcement stage as an existing decision of one enforcing Court may 
affect the ability to enforce that same award in another enforcing Court.  
 
In relation to scenario (d) above, a Court may be faced with an application whether to allow the 
enforcement of an award that one party alleges was obtained by fraud even though the Courts of 
the seat of arbitration dismissed an application to amend an application before it to include an 
allegation of fraud.  That was the position in Anatolie Stati v The Republic of Kazakhstan89. 
The dispute arose out of a liquefied petroleum gas plant owned by the claimants. They claimed 
to have spent about $245 million on the plant and when the relationship broke down they 
initiated arbitral proceeding pursuant to the Energy Charter Treaty and the claimants obtained an 
award of about $500million.The tribunal based its assessment of the valuation of the plant on an 
indicative bid of $199 million that the claimants had received from a third party, KazMunai Gas 
(“KMG”).  
Kazakhstan sought to set aside the award before the Svea Court of Appeal in Sweden which was 
the seat of the arbitration and there was a subsequent application by Kazakhstan to amend its 
application to include allegation of fraud and that the award should be set aside on public policy 
grounds. This application was dismissed in December 2016 and in March 2016 the USA Court 
also refused a motion by Kazakhstan to amend its application so as to add the alleged fraud as a 
                                                          
87 See The Sennar (No2) at fn 72. 
88 See para 59.  
89 [2017] EWHC 1348 (Comm). 
ground. In the meantime, Kazakhstan issued an application to set aside the permission that had 
been granted to enforce the award in England90.  After issuing its application in the UK, it 
successfully applied to the Courts in the USA for disclosure and a third party was ordered to 
disclose certain documents relating to the contracts.  The documents obtained from the disclosure 
indicated that a lesser amount may have been spent by the claimants.  All these developments 
meant that Kazakhstan applied to the English Courts to amend its English application to add a 
further ground that the award would contravene English public policy by reason of fraud by the 
claimants.  Knowles J held that Swedish and USA decisions do not create estoppel and 
Kazakhstan was entitled to rely on the evidence obtained since the award was rendered and there 
was sufficient prima facie case that the award was obtained by fraud91.  The USA Court’s refusal 
to allow Kazakhstan to add the alleged fraud to its case was made on the basis that the arbitral 
tribunal had not relied on the claimants’ evidence of the plant’s costs. It did not address the 
question whether the tribunal was misled because KMG’s bid was based on fraudulent material 
and the claimants’ knew that when they presented the bid evidence92.  In relation to the Swedish 
decision, the judge noted that the Swedish Court’s refusal to set aside the award was based on its 
reasoning that KMG’s bid was directly decisive to the tribunal’s decision and the bid was not 
false. The decision did not address the question of whether the allegedly false evidence of the 
plant’s cost was of “indirect decisive impact” for the outcome of the case93. Even if it had been 
decided, as this is a public policy issue the English Courts would still have to decide whether 
enforcement of the award should be permitted, as English public policy is a matter for the 
English Courts94. Accordingly, the fraud allegation would be examined at a trial and decided on 
its merits.  
                                                          
90  Kazakhstan sought to set aside the permission on three grounds. First, that there was no valid arbitration 
agreement. Secondly, that the tribunal was invalidly constituted and lastly, that there had been a number of serious 
procedural errors that prevented Kazakhstan from presenting its case.  
91 See paras 87 and 92. 
92 See paras 50-55. 
93 See paras 62-64.  The judge also noted that “… the Swedish Court also reasoned that the KMG Indicative Bid was 
not (itself) false evidence. That assessment holds at the time the KMG Indicative Bid was made, but I respectfully 
question whether it still holds when the KMG Indicative Bid later deployed by a party who knows (but continues to 
conceal) that it is the product of that party’s fraud”. At para 66.  
94 See paras 86 and 87. 
In relation to scenario (f) above, where a party has unsuccessfully challenged an award at the 
seat of the arbitration and the seat upholds the award, should that decision raise issue estoppel if 
the party that unsuccessfully challenged the award wishes to resist enforcement in a foreign 
Court. In Gujarat NRE Coke Limited v Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Limited95, Gujarat had 
unsuccessfully challenged a consent award made by the tribunal under section 68 of the Act. The 
challenge centered on whether Gujarat had been given reasonable opportunity to present its case 
before a consent award was issued.   The Court took the view that the tribunal was entitled to 
make the award and that the parties had been afforded reasonable opportunity to present their 
case and the correct procedure was adopted.  
Coeclerici subsequently sought to enforce the award in Australia but Gujarat tried to resist 
enforcement on the basis that it had not been given reasonable opportunity to present its case. 
The Federal Court of Australia96 held that the award was enforceable because the issue of 
"reasonable opportunity" had been considered by the English Courts and rejected hence it could 
not be re-litigated. In any event, it would be inappropriate for the enforcing Court to reach a 
different conclusion to that of the supervisory Court. Consequently, the award was enforceable. 
This pragmatic approach is to be welcomed given that, not only does it take into account issue 
estoppel, but it also recognises the importance of the supervisory Court.   It stops a party re-
running the same arguments it unsuccessfully ran before the Courts of the seat of the arbitration.   
 
However, in some jurisdictions, the matter is made more complicated by the need for a 
reciprocity treaty on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This was the approach 
adopted by the Ukrainian  Courts in Pacific Inter-Link SDN BHD v EFKO Food Ingridents Ltd97 
where the Court of Appeal of the Odessa region upheld the decision of a lower Court to grant 
permission to enforce awards that had been set aside by the English Courts. In the English 
proceedings98, Steel J had set aside six awards under section 67 of the Act on the basis that the 
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Seehttp://www.cisarbitration.com/2012/09/17/ukrainian-court-enforces-arbitral-awards-set-aside-in-the-uk/ accessed 
July 19 2017. 
98 [2011] EWHC 923 (Comm), [2011] Arb. L.R. 13. 
arbitrators lacked substantive jurisdiction.  Despite this, the Ukrainian Courts were prepared to 
enforce the awards on the basis that the English judgment was not entitled to be recognised on 
the basis of reciprocity. The decision of the Ukrainian Courts is a curious one and demonstrates 
the inconsistencies that are emerging in relation to annulled awards. As argued above, arbitration 
is a consensual process and the jurisdiction of the tribunal is a key element of the arbitral 
process. Where a supervisory Court of the seat of arbitration finds that a tribunal lacks 
jurisdiction, it does seem peculiar that the enforcement of that award is dependent on reciprocity 
rather than the breach of fairness or the parties’ agreement. In the author's view, there are no 
compelling reasons in the instant case to warrant enforcing the award set aside by the 
supervisory Courts. 
 
The French Approach 
As discussed above, the English Courts have taken the view that arbitral proceedings must be 
anchored to a legal system. The French approach is somewhat different in that arbitration is 
detached from local law. This has led the French Courts to come to the conclusion that awards 
that have been set aside at the seat of the arbitration can be enforced and have been enforced in 
France. They place very little or no weight at all on any decision rendered by the supervisory 
Courts. This was made clear by French Cour de Casssation in Hilmarton Ltd v Omnium de 
Traitement et de Valorisation99 held that: 
"The award rendered in Switzerland is an international award which is not integrated in 
the legal system of that state so it remains in existence even if set aside and its 
recognition in France is not contrary to international public policy". 
In Hilmarton, the French Courts on two occasions recognised an arbitral award that had been set 
aside by the Swiss Courts which was the seat of the arbitration. The French approach seems to be 
driven by the desire to develop an autonomous arbitral system where substantive rules for 
international arbitration are not dependent or tied any national law.  This approach was re 
emphasised in Societe Pt Putrabali Adyamulia v Societe Rena Holding100 where the seat of the 
Arbitration was England. Putrabali successfully challenged the award on a point of law pursuant 
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to section 69 of the Act. The award was remitted back to the tribunal which then rendered a new 
award in favor of Putrabali. Rena was however still able to enforce the first award in France that 
was in its favour but had been set aside by the English Courts. The French Courts took the view 
that a foreign arbitral award is not anchored to any national order101. It was for the enforcing 
Court to decide which rules are applicable in relation to enforcement.   A similar approach has 
been adopted in other French cases such as General de L’aviation Civille de L’Emirat de Dubai v 
Societe International Bechtel Co102, Chromalloy Aeroservices v Arab Republic of Egypt 103 and 
more recently by the Tribunal de grande instance in Maximov. Indeed, the comments of the 
French Courts in Hilmarton and Putrabali suggest judicial protectionism. 
 
The American Approach 
 
Given that some of the cases considered in this article have involved the American Courts, it is 
worth considering briefly the position there. Initially, the issue of whether or not an award that 
has been set aside at the seat of the arbitration could be enforced was considered by the US 
Courts in Chromalloy v Arab Republic of Egypt104. The Egyptian Courts had set aside the award 
on the basis that the arbitrators had misapplied Egyptian law. Nevertheless, the American Courts 
enforced the award on the basis that Article V(1) (e) of the New York Convention does not state 
that an annulled award must not be recognised. Consequently, if the Court was to refuse to 
enforce the award it would militate against the US public policy in favour of final and binding 
arbitration of commercial disputes105  However, in subsequent cases, the American Courts have 
been more measured in their approach. Whilst the American Courts have maintained that they 
have discretion as to whether or not to enforce an annulled award, nevertheless a party seeking 
the enforcement of an annulled award must show “adequate reasons” why the Courts should 
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102 Cour d’appel de Paris 2004/07635 (2006) Rev. Arb 695-709. 
103 (1997) XXII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 691.  The US Courts also enforced the same award but for 
different reason. The US decision is discussed below.  
104 939 F.Supp 907, 913 (D.D.C 1996). 
105 At 913. The decision in Chromalloy has been upheld and followed in other cases such as Karaha Boda Co. v 
Perusahaan  Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F3d 35, 367 (5th Cir. 2007). 
refuse to recognise the foreign judgment.106  In Baker Marine (Nig) Ltd v Chevron (Nig) Ltd107  
the US Courts refused to enforce an award set aside at the seat of the arbitration because the 
party seeking to enforce the award in the US had not shown adequate reasons as to why the 
foreign  decision setting aside the award should not be recognised. A party seeking the 
enforcement of an annulled award must show “extraordinary reasons”108 for doing so. 
However, where there are specific concerns about the manner the award was set aside, for 
example where there has been a retrospective application of the law, the American Courts may 
still decide to enforce the award. This was the position in Corporacion Mexicana de 
Matenimiento Intergral, S De RL De CV (“Commisa”) v Pemex- Exploracion y Produccion109 
where the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enforced an award that was annulled by 
the Mexican Courts. The dispute arose out of an agreement to build offshore gas platforms in the 
Gulf of Mexico and Commisa obtained an award in a Mexico seated arbitration in its favour and 
sought to enforce this award in New York. The Southern District Court of New York enforced110 
the Mexican award but Pemex sought to set aside that decision on the basis that the Mexican 
award had been annulled in Mexico on the basis that the arbitrators dealt with matters that were 
not arbitrable. Commisa appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Given that the award 
had been set aside by the Mexican Courts, the Court of Appeals remitted the decision back to the 
District Court for further consideration. The District Court reconsidered the award and came to 
the same conclusion that it reached before and decided to enforce the award.  Commissa then 
appealed again to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower Court. It did so 
on the basis that retrospective application of new laws by the Mexican Courts was unfair because 
the Mexican Courts had simply applied laws that were not in force at the time the parties 
concluded the contract and the Court of Appeals was also concerned that if the award was not 
recognised in the US, that would leave Commisa without redress.  The Court of Appeals decided 
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109 Case No. 13-4022 (2d Cir, August 2, 2016). 
110  962 F.Supp. 2d  642 (S.D.N. Y. 2013. 
to exercise its discretion under Article V of the Panama Convention to enforce the annulled 
award111. 
 
Whilst the Court of Appeals decided to enforce an annulled award, there are special reasons for 
doing so. The Mexican Government passed laws retrospectively which sought to deny the relief 
it sought in the arbitration.  The conduct of the Mexican authorities would suggest that there are 
significant reasons why the discretion of whether or not to enforce the award should be 
exercised. Given the circumstance, in the Commissa case, it was right for the American Courts to 
enforce the Mexican Award even though it had been set aside by the Mexican Courts.  Perhaps 
this is an example of where the principles of "honesty and natural justice" have been breached by 
the supervisory Courts. Such a scenario may warrant the enforcement of an annulled award.  
 
The discretionary and sensible approach is further evident in Getma International v The Republic 
of Guinea112.  The District Court of Columbia refused to enforce a foreign arbitral award that 
was set aside by the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) because the tribunal 
breached the arbitration rules of the CCJA as it solicited higher fees despite being told not to do 
so. The District Court again noted the discretionary nature of the New York Convention in 
relation to annulled awards.  The Court refused to accept the argument that the test for public 
policy can simply be whether a Court would set aside an arbitration award if that had been made 
and enforced in the US. In essence, different countries have different regimes in relation to 
setting aside an arbitral award. Consequently, the New York Convention does not endorse a 
regime where the enforcement Court is second guessing the judgment of a foreign Court with 
competent jurisdiction to annul the award. The Court further noted that an “erroneous legal 
reasoning or misapplication of the law is generally not a violation of public policy within the 
meaning of the New York Convention”113. The District Court’s decision was upheld in July 2017 
on the basis that the annulled award would need to be repugnant to United Sates' most 
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fundamental notions of morality and justice for it to intervene in “this quintessentially foreign 
dispute”114.  
 
A similar approach was adopted in Thai – Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co Ltd & Hongsa Lignite Co 
Ltd v Government of Loa115 where the Southern District Court of New York refused to enforce 
an award that had been set aside at the seat of the arbitration despite having originally granted an 
order to enforce. The dispute concerned a project development agreement in relation to mining 
operation rights. The claimant commenced a Malaysian seated arbitration and obtained an award 
in its favour. This award was initially confirmed by the Southern District Court of New York.  
However, that award was later challenged by the Government of Loa before the Malaysian 
Courts and it was annulled on the basis that the tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction.  Upon 
application by the Government of Loa, the District Court was asked to set aside its earlier 
decision enforcing the award. The District Court noted that it had the discretion to continue to 
enforce the award under the New York Convention but decided not to exercise that discretion 
because the circumstances in this case did not “rise to the level of violating basic notions of 
justice”.   
 
The American approach is one of pragmatism. Whilst there have been cases where they have 
enforced annulled awards, the Commisa case is one  where one could find justifiable reasons for 
the approach adopted by the American  Courts. Indeed, it may well be that the same decision 
would have been reached by the English Courts and this scenario may satisfy the English test of 
“honesty and natural justice”.    
 
Enforcing Annulled Awards: An Alternative View 
As discussed above, there has been a tendency for certain commentators and jurisdiction to see 
arbitration as an independent and autonomous system of a dispute resolution. In the author’s 
view the French approach fails to take into account some of the key principles of international 
arbitration.  The following observations are made in light of recent developments. 
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 In Putrabali, the French Court noted that justice is controlled by the enforcing Court. This 
nationalistic approach in the author's view is an attempt to control and influence the development 
of international arbitration law. This approach does little to promote finality of arbitral awards, 
rather it encourages forum shopping.  It is important to remember that arbitration is a consensual 
process and the arbitration agreement is vital to any arbitral process.  If the parties have chosen a 
particular seat, they have agreed to be bound by the arbitration laws and the judicial process of 
that seat.  Accordingly, where the Courts of the seat of arbitration have set aside the award, 
surely that must carry a great deal of force.  On the other hand, an enforcing Court is not chosen 
or agreed upon by the parties in their arbitration agreement. In fact, the parties do not necessarily 
know where they would be enforcing any award at the time the arbitration agreement is 
concluded. The role of the enforcing Court is different to that of the seat. Indeed, one must be 
careful not to allow the enforcing Court to alter the parties’ agreement that the Courts of the seat 
will be the supervisory Court. We should not seek to ascribe a role to the enforcing Court that 
was never agreed to by the parties nor conferred upon it by the New York Convention.  
 In addition, where the parties are commercial entities (or wealthy individuals) who should have 
sought and received legal advice, there is something to be said for the argument that if the parties 
have chosen a seat that lacks the expertise to deal with arbitral matters or views arbitration with 
suspicion, then the parties must accept that they are running a risk that the arbitral process may 
not run smoothly. It is important to note that many of the cases that have come before the 
English Courts recently in relation to annulled awards originate from Russia. As noted by Burton 
J in Maximov, it may well be the case that certain decisions may have been  reached by the 
Russian Courts because of their approach to arbitration116  but this is the risk the parties run by 
choosing a particular seat.   
French Courts and commentators have seized on the permissive nature of Article V(1) (e) of the 
New York Convention. In Putrabali, the French Court cited Article VII of the New York 
Convention as justification for the autonomous approach of arbitral awards. In the author's view 
it is difficult to see how Article VII can be used as a justification to disregard the decision of the 
seat of arbitration. Indeed, any justification for exercising discretion is to be found in Article V 
which uses permissive language and not Article VII. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the 
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permissive language of Article V can be read to mean a total disregard for the annulment 
decision of the seat of the arbitration.  If the intention of the drafters of the New York 
Convention was indeed to confer such wide discretion on the enforcing Courts, then the 
Convention would have stated so or there would be some evidence of this in the travaux 
preparatoires.  
A practical problem that may arise as a result of the French approach is neatly illustrated by 
Dallah. The decision of the French Court creates a situation where the award is enforceable in 
France but not in England. Although the English Supreme Court could not set aside the French 
award as it was not the supervisory Court, it creates the situation where there are two conflicting 
decisions on the same award. It raises the interesting question of which of the decisions will be 
given precedent if recognition or enforcement is sought in other countries. Perhaps the answer 
will depend on whether the enforcing Court has any principles similar to issue estoppel and what 
degree of importance that Court places on the decision of the supervisory Courts. If on the other 
hand, that country favours the principle of issue estoppel it may well choose to enforce the 
decision of the English Courts. If it places emphasis on the seat of the arbitration or has no 
principle similar to issue estoppel, it may well come to the conclusion that as the supervisory 
Court, the decision of the French Court of Appeal is to be preferred.  
 
Another issue that is emerging is that of issue estoppel. As discussed above, issue estoppel is a 
potential bar to enforcing awards. We are now in a position where the decision of one enforcing 
Court may affect the ability of a party to enforce an award based not on an annulled decision by 
the Courts of the seat of arbitration but because of issue estoppel. This was the position in Diag 
where enforcement was refused by the English Courts on the basis of the decision of Austria’s 
Supreme Court.  It may well be the case that the arbitration clause in Diag was unusual but there 
is obiter to suggest that enforcement may be refused in England where a particular issue has been 
argued and lost in another enforcing Court. In Chatiers De L'Atlatique S.A v Gaztransport & 
Technigaz S.A.S117   a London seated tribunal had dismissed all the claims before it. The 
respondent in the arbitration sought to enforce the award that was rendered in its favour in 
France and the claimant in the arbitration resisted enforcement on the basis that the award was 
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obtained by fraud. The French Court rejected the fraud argument and held that the award was 
enforceable.  In the meantime the claimant in the arbitration also sought to have the award set 
aside before the English Court as the supervisory Court of the arbitration.  Flaux J held that the 
award was tainted by fraud but also noted obiter that where a party has raised the same issue of 
fraud before the enforcing Court and lost, it could not circumvent the application of the doctrine 
of issue estoppel. Consequently, that party is barred from raising those same issues before the 
English Court118. 
Concluding Remarks 
This article examined the issue of enforcing annulled awards and argued against delocalisation.   
International commercial arbitration has never been and will never be an autonomous legal order. 
The emerging inconsistencies in relation to annulled awards highlight the differences between 
the English approach and that of the French. On the face of it, the French approach may seem to 
be pro-enforcement. However, as demonstrated above, the French approach is self-defeating as it 
encourages forum shopping and seeks to ascribe a role to enforcing Courts that is not 
contemplated by either the New York Convention or the parties in their arbitration agreement.  
The role of the enforcing Court should be to facilitate the contractual agreement of the parties to 
honour any resulting award and not to usurp the powers of the supervisory Courts. The French 
approach does not sit comfortably with one of the key tenets of arbitration namely party 
autonomy. What is needed is a pragmatic approach which recognises the importance of the 
supervisory Courts but also ensures that principles of "natural justice" are upheld.  
Indeed, the pragmatic approach of the English and US Courts is to be welcomed. The high 
threshold established in Malicorp and Maximov is a clear indication that, whilst the English 
Courts are prepared to review a foreign Court's decision to annul an award, it will only enforce 
that award in very limited circumstances with cogent evidence. There is also a clear message that 
a supervisory Court retains control over the arbitral process in its territory and the English Courts 
will not second guess that Court nor rectify any deficiencies in the decision of the same. 
Consequently, in the author's view, the parties must make an informed decision when choosing 
the seat. Given the importance of the seat of the arbitration, it is important that parties carefully 
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consider their seat before choosing one. If they choose a seat that is hostile to arbitration and 
awards are set aside incorrectly, they have to accept the consequences of that choice and should 
not look to the enforcing Court to put right the inadequacies of the seat they have chosen.    
Furthermore, a party must also consider carefully where to enforce its awards because an 
unfavourable decision by one enforcing Court could affect that party’s ability to enforce in 
England even though that award has not been set aside by the supervisory Courts. A pragmatic 
approach that respects the choice of the parties will surely help tame the unruly horse.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
